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STORIES IN ADVOCACY & IN DECISIONS
THE NARRATIVE COMPELS THE RESULT1
The Honorable Justice LD.F. Callinan AC
Theory has it that the best evidence-that is to say, the best narrative-determines the result. This theory is rarely questioned. But,
what determines the narrative? The capacity of litigants for self-justification is almost limitless. That is why independent witnesses are so
important. They are innocent, it is said, of self-justification. True, but
only partly true: what about their attentiveness at the time; their powers of observation; their desire for relevance, or importance, or even
notoriety; their delight in their day in court; their recall and ability to
understand the questions and to give an unexaggerated and accurate
account of what they read, saw, or heard. The judge, however, is not
confined to these.
Do not forget the documents, those contemporaneous smoking
guns written when litigation was not even a gleam in the eyes of the
lawyers who carefully monitor every word the executives write or
email now that the writs have been issued and discovery is imminent.
Do even contemporaneous documents always tell the truth though?
That may well be doubted in these litigious times of in-house counsel
and plaintiffs' lawyers competing for the ultimate pot of gold-that
great representative contingency action in the sky that will set up
every partner for life. The old solicitors once told their articled clerks,
"Never write a letter or a memorandum, that you would be embarrassed to see in evidence in a court." I do not doubt that in-house
counsel give exactly the same advice to corporations' executives these
days as a matter of course.
It is out of this great sprawl of claim and counterclaim, welter of
documents, accusation and defence, avarice, human fallibility and imperfectability that the trial judge has to construct the ultimate narrative, the judgment, and the factual findings, which will determine not
only the trial, but also the first and the second appeals if they are
launched.
Let me at this point make an interpolation. For the last century, or
effectively since the substitution of appeal for writ of error, the legal
fiction has been that although the parties and witnesses may be fallible
on the facts, the judge is not. This is so, even though the widow's
future sustenance, the corporation's solvency, and indeed the vast preponderance of the cases will be decided, not on fine points of law, but
on the facts.
1. Article presented at The Power of Stories: Intersections of Law, Culture, &
Literature Symposium in Gloucester, England, July 2005.
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I confess that when I came to the Court after thirty-three years as a

barrister and five earlier years as a solicitor, I brought with me more
than a mild sense of dissatisfaction with the way the appellate courts
of Australia treated cases on the facts. Until recent times, only New

South Wales had a permanent Court of Appeal, and it heard civil matters only. Criminal appeals in that State, and all appeals in the other
States, were heard by rotating panels of trial judges.

I recall on one occasion, waiting at the back of the courtroom of the
Full Court, as it was called, for my appeal to be reached and listening
to the criminal appeal preceding it. The appellant seemed to have

more than a reasonably arguable point about a defect in the trial
judge's summing up to the jury. I was shocked to hear the expostulation of the presiding judge that he was, "sick of the Full Court being
used as a forum for the criticism of trial judges." I turned to my instructing solicitor who confirmed that I had not misheard. The judges
could be as defensive of one another as the chateau generals in World
War I. I can recall hearing on many other occasions, occasions upon

which I do not doubt that everyone in the appellate courtroom knew
that the trial judge had misunderstood or misstated the facts, the Full
Court's fatal incantation that the trial judge had seen and heard the
witnesses and that his findings on the facts could not be disturbed.

In recent times, however, there has been a recognition in Australia
of the injustices that have been perpetrated in the shadow of this incantation. The basis for it has been demonstrated to be flawed. In my
country, at least, it relies for its validity upon a series of cases in the
admiralty jurisdiction of the United Kingdom in which the appellate

courts declined to interfere with the judgments at first instance. 2
Without reference to the special constitution of the Admiralty

Courts,3 the Australian High Court, in a series of cases, propounded a

rule which made factual findings and decisions based on them impreg-

2. See Bland v. Ross, (1860) 14 Moo. P.C. 210, 235-37 (A.C.); 15 Eng. Rep. 284,
293-94 (case referred to as "The Julia"); Reid v. Aberdeen, Newcastle, & Hull Steam
Co., (1868) 2 L.R.-P.C. 245, 247, 252 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (following "The
Julia" precedent); S.S. Hontestroom v. S.S. Sagaporack, [1927] A.C. 37 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
3. If matters heard by the Admiralty Court involved nautical questions, including
questions of skill and experience in navigation, judges were usually assisted by two of
the Elder Brethren of the Trinity House, who sat with the judge as assessors. Their
function was not to decide questions of fact, but to advise the Court on nautical matters. The decision on the case may have rested entirely with the judge who was not
bound to follow the advice of his assessors, but as expertise almost always informed
the findings of fact and the decision in the case, it is easy to see why appellate courts
in the jurisdiction would be very restrained in intervening except for error of law. See
BRUCE ET AL., A TREATISE ON THE JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE ENGLISH
COURTS IN ADMIRALTY ACTIONS AND APPEALS 441-42 (3d ed. 1902); R.G. MARSDEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COLLISIONS AT SEA 291 (5th ed. 1904); see generally Beryl, (1884) 9 P.D. 4.
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nable.4 The rule was propounded in the teeth of enactments establishing rights of appeal, which universally drew no distinction between
error of law and error of fact.5
The recognition to which I have referred came at last in Fox v.
Percy,' in which I said this:
Statements made by appellate judges about findings of fact by trial
judges repeatedly emphasise the advantages attaching to an opportunity to hear and see witnesses. They tend to understate or even
overlook that appellate courts enjoy advantages as well: for example, the collective knowledge and experience of no fewer than three
judges armed with an organised and complete record of the proceedings, and the opportunity to take an independent overview of
the proceedings below, in a 7different atmosphere from, and a less
urgent setting than the trial.
In the same case, I attempted to express myself with candour and said:
To impose the test stated in Devries is, I think, to do what was said
to be impermissible as long ago as 1920, to elevate as a practical
matter, the decision of a judge sitting alone to the level of a verdict
of a jury. This is so even though judges are bound to give reasons
and those reasons are required to be able to withstand scrutiny.
The value of that scrutiny will be much reduced if a statement in the
reasons that the demeanour of a witness has been determinative of
the first instance decision, is effectively taken to be conclusive of the
outcome of an appeal by way of rehearing. The vast majority of the
cases tried in this country are tried by judges sitting alone and depend upon their facts rather than upon the application of complex
legal principles. To impose an unduly high barrier, and not one
sanctioned by the enactment conferring the right of appeal would
be to deny recourse by litigants to what the Parliament of the State
has said they should have. Judges are fallible on issues of fact as
well as of law; sometimes they are obliged to work under a great
deal of pressure, and sometimes they are denied a timely transcript.
In the days when rights of appeal were first enacted, notes and transcripts were much less complete and reliable than they now are.
And today courts of first instance, in some jurisdictions at least, rely
heavily on written statements, certainly of the evidence in chief, the
4. See Abalos v. Australian Postal Comm'n (1990) 171 C.L.R. 167, 177-79;
Dearman v. Dearman (1908) 7 C.L.R. 549, 549-50, 561, 565 (Austl.); Devries v. Australian Nat'l Rys. Comm'n (1993) 177 C.L.R. 472, 479-80; London Bank of Austl. Ltd.
v. Kendall (1920) 28 C.L.R. 401, 407-08; see generally Warren v. Coombes (1979) 142
C.L.R. 531 (Austl.).
5. Regarding appeals, for example, section 75A of the Supreme Court Act of
1970 relevantly provides that it "applies to an appeal to the Court and to an appeal in
proceedings in the Court," and that "the Court may make any finding or assessment,
give any judgment, make any order or give any direction which ought to have been
given or made or which the nature of the case requires." Supreme Court Act, 1970,
§ 75A (Austi.).
6. Fox v. Percy (2003) 214 C.L.R. 118 (Austl.).
7. Id. at 163; cf. State Rail Auth. of New South Wales v. Earthline Constrs. Pty.
Ltd. (1999) 73 A.L.J.R. 306, 331-32 (Austl.) (Kirby J. discussing credibility findings).
Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022
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oral adducing of which might on occasions have been as, or even
more revealing than, evidence adduced from an honest but inarticulate or nervous witness in cross-examination. Occasional errors of
fact are bound to be made. No litigant should be expected to accept
with equanimity that his or her right of appeal to an intermediate
court is of much less utility because it goes to a factual error that
can be explained away by a judge-made rule, than an appeal on a
question of law: or that although the trial judge was wrong on the
facts, there was no incontrovertible fact against which the judge's
error could be measured. This Court recently heard an appeal
which provided an insight into the disposition of one New South
Wales judge at least with respect to his task of deciding a personal
injuries case. During the course of an application to dispense with a
jury to which one party was entitled, and had requisitioned, he said:
"I'll tell you straight out, I would do away with all civil
juries in the State, instantly and retrospectively. I think it
leads to, quite frankly, perfectly obvious miscarriages of
justice in these Courts every week, every single week...
I've been astounded here in the last six weeks calling this
list, how many plaintiffs seek juries. I think it's prima facie
evidence of professional negligence myself, for a plaintiff
to seek a jury."
Demeanour based judgments in favour of plaintiffs following remarks of that kind are hardly likely to inspire confidence in persons
wishing to defend claims against them. The test stated in Devries, in
my respectful opinion, appears at least to go beyond some of the
previous authorities in this Court. If faithful obedience henceforth
to the statutory language might be seen as a departure from some
other previous authorities of this Court, there would not be anything especially novel about that. This Court has made such departures in recent times on a number of occasions: examples are Burnie
Port Authority v. GeneralJones Pty Ltd., Trident General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. McNiece Bros. Pty Ltd., David Securities Pty Ltd. v.
Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2],
Wilson v. The Queen, R. v. L., Daniels CorporationInternationalPty
Ltd. v. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and Brodie v. Singleton Shire Council. A test of "glaring improbability",
[sic] "incontrovertible error" or "palpable misuse of an advantage"
is not what the Act requires or all previous relevant decisions hold.
Such a test pays, I am inclined to think, altogether too much deference to a trial judge's view of the facts and advantages, both actual
and supposed. This is not to deny, however, that deference should
be paid to first instance findings of credit. It is simply to prefer a
test of wrongness, and to be guided by, rather8 than bound by findings on credit, or on the basis of demeanour.
8. Fox, 214 C.L.R. at 165-66 (citing Kendall, 28 C.L.R. 401; Pettitt v. Dunkley
(1971) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 376; Burnie Port Auth. v. Gen. Jones Pty. Ltd. (1994) 179 C.L.R.
520 (Austl.); Trident Gen. Ins. Co. v. McNiece Bros. Proprietary (1988) 165 C.L.R.
107 (Austl.); David Sec. Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth Bank (1992) 175 C.L.R. 353
(Austl.); Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.); Wilson v. The Queen
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol12/iss1/15
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Having made that diversion, I return to my theme. It is, of course,
not only the way the actual facts are narrated that determines the
case, but also the order in which they are narrated and the facts that
are omitted. There was a time, certainly in relation to negligence,
when the chronology was all important. It is now more than 160 years
since Davies v. Mann9 was decided. Let me remind you of its facts.
The defendant had the misfortune, whilst driving a wagon and horses
at "a smartish pace," to hit a donkey and kill it. These were the days
before the apportionment of liability for negligence, when courts
strived for a formula to enable an injured plaintiff to recover even if
he had been a substantial contributor to his own loss. It was Mr. Davies who left his donkey quite negligently unattended to graze on a
highway with a pair of its legs tied. Mr. Davies succeeded in recovering for the loss of his donkey. Baron Parke's explanation for the invention of what came to be known as the rule of the "last clear
chance," the "lost opportunity," or the "last clear opportunity" is not
the most convincing of justifications:
[A]lithough the ass may have been wrongfully there, still the defendant was bound to go along the road at such a pace as would be
likely to prevent mischiefs Were [sic] this not so, a man might justify
the driving over goods left on a public highway, or even over a man
lying asleep there, or the purposely running against a carriage going
on the wrong side of the road.1"
The statement of the chronology became everything. The events
leading up to the accident itself faded into insignificance in comparison to the act or omission identified as the final relevant one-here,
the defendant's progress down the highway. A different verdict would
have resulted, however, had the chronology been stated differently,
i.e., identifying the final relevant conduct as the failure of the defendant to stay near or return to the donkey and remove it from the highway as the plaintiff approached or to warn him of the donkey's
presence. Of course, when the apportionment legislation was introduced, the device of making the chronology of the narrative all important could be discarded. In Australia, for instance, this happened as
soon as each of the jurisdictions enacted its own apportionment legislation. In short, the form of the narrative of the facts changed but not
the facts themselves.
The narrative can become different, indeed dramatically different, if
facts are omitted. I know of one permanent appellate court in Austra(1992) 174 C.L.R. 313 (Austl.); The Queen v. L. (1991) 174 C.L.R. 379 (Austl.); Daniels Corp. Int'l Pty. Ltd. v. Australian Competition & Consumer Comm'n (2002) 213
C.L.R. 543; Brodie v. Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 C.L.R. 512 (Austl.) and
quoting Justices Kirby and Callinan in Gerlach v. Clifton Bricks Pty. Ltd. (2002) 209
C.L.R. 478, 488).
9. Davies v. Mann, (1842) 10 M. & W. 546 (Exch. Div.); 152 Eng. Rep. 588.
10. Id. at 549.
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lia whose members debated at length, what I understand to be common practice in Great Britain and elsewhere, the allocation of the task
of stating the facts that will form the basis of the judgment or judgments to one judge and the acceptance of it by all of the judges. Repeatedly, the leader of the Australian Court sought to have the judges
agree to this. The arguments were powerful. Judgments would be
shorter, ratios would be clearer, and the acceptance of one statement
of the facts would result in fewer dissenting judgments. The proposal
was always rejected. Every judge knew that the statement of the facts
or omission of certain facts could be decisive of the cases.
There are many different ways in which judges may find the facts.
By and large, the work of a judge is not creative work. This is so
despite the explosion of the myth that judges do not make or change
the law, of which I will say something a little later. But whether you
think judges should or should not be creative, I do not doubt that they
need to be imaginative. Imaginative about what you may ask. And, I
would answer-the law, human affairs, human frailty, vulnerability,
depression and exhilaration, youth, middle age, and old age. How do
judges become imaginative? I would answer-by reading. That is the
way to improve the narrative.
Law and literature are inextricably related. Martha Nussbaum, the
North American philosopher and lawyer, theorizes that an extensive
knowledge of creative literature is highly desirable for judicial work,
that it is a major source of knowledge, and essential for compassion
and tolerance. Justice Richard Posner of the United States Court of
Appeals has reviewed her book, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life,11 and various papers that she has published with
approbation and is of a similar opinion. In her book, she makes the
point that judges deal with narratives, and that they have to try to
understand the whole story, with all of its divergences and apparent
inconsistencies. An acquaintance with creative literature enables a
judge to extend the mind to encompass all of this detail and to deposit
the case flexibly in its appropriate department of the common law. I
paraphrase what she has said, but there is much in it that is, I think,
irrefutable.
Justice Richard Posner has turned to Tom Wolfe's The Bonfire of
the Vanities 2 to make the point. Although he is critical of the style, he
admires the way in which the author graphically demonstrates how
catastrophic an encounter with the legal process can be. The New
York legal system may not always be Kafkaesque, but as with any
legal system, resort to it should be a matter of last resort. Wolfe
would certainly have read Kafka. I doubt whether he could have writ11.

MARTHA

PUBLIC LIFE

12.

NUSSBAUM,

POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY

IMAGINATION

AND

(1995).

TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES
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ten The Bonfire of the Vanities if he had not. All lawyers would do
well to read both.
13
In his book, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation, Justice Posner said this with which I do fully agree:
Judges can obtain insights from literature that have nothing to do
with effective presentation or persuasion but have rather to do with
the spirit, meaning, or values found in literature, and so in a rough
sense with content rather than just form. The relevant content,
however, is not necessarily or even primarily paraphrasable content,
which is the focus of the moralizing tradition in criticism, whose adherents range from Plato, Horace, Augustine, Samuel Johnson,
Bentham, and Tolstoy to F. R. Leavis and Yvor Winters, to Marxist
critics such as Terry Eagleton, and to feminist critics. Moralistic or
didactic critics hold with varying degree of emphasis that the function of literature is to edify and that the canon should be confined to
those works (if any-Plato thought there were few, and Bentham
though there were none) that do edify. So one can imagine these
critics preparing a reading list for judges. If poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world, should not judges, above all
others, pay attention to the poets' preachments? More mundanely,
should not judges look to literature for instruction in the moral principles that guide or should guide judicial decisionmaking in that
large open area where text and precedent and other conventional
sources of legal authority run out? Might Buck v. Bell have been
decided differently4 if Holmes had been steeped in William Blake
and Jane Austen?
To that, I would add this: literature, fiction included, is clearly capable
of instruction as to form or narrative, as well as to content.
In his excellent The Art of the Advocate,"5 Richard Du Cann demonstrates how, on more than a few occasions, superior advocacy has
almost certainly produced grave injustice. He demonstrates this by
reference to a handful of cases, one of which is Professor Harold
Laski's defamation action against a number of newspapers that published an article about a speech that he made during an early post-war
election campaign in the United Kingdom. 6 Counsel for the defence
was Sir Patrick Hastings QC who, incidentally, was a successful playwright some years before and, ironically, a member of an earlier Labor Government. Du Cann makes the point that Sir Patrick
Hastings's devastating-some might say excessive or even grossly unfair-cross-examination of Laski was decisive for the defendants.
Later, Laski wrote an elegant account of his experiences of a kind
13. RICHARD A. POSNER,
(1988).
14. Id. at 299.
15. RICHARD Du CANN,
(1964).
16. Id. at 9-10.

LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION

THE ART OF THE ADVOCATE
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which all counsel and every judge would do well to read. It sums up
better than anything else I have read, the agony of the litigant and the
horrors of the witness box:
[I]f hope is a stimulant beyond any other, nothing is quite so decisive as failure. You may be beaten in a game and enjoy, nevertheless, the pleasure of combat. You may be 'plucked' in an
examination and yet know that it is a temporary setback you will
overcome in a month. You may even be routed in a skirmish and
rest confident in the knowledge that it is only part of a larger campaign. But when you are beaten in the Courts of Law there is a
kind of dumb finality about it which I can only compare with the
ultimate emphasis of death.
Every element in a civil trial goes to deepen this sense of finality.
In the proceedings themselves you are almost bound to feel like a
marionette. The speeches on both sides seem remote from the
events you know; they are like blood in a test tube compared with
blood in a living person. You know, of course, that it is about you
the lawyers are talking, but all that they say seems to have lost its
colour, its vividness, its sense of life, and to be reduced to a shadowlike skeleton which will never be clothed once more in flesh and
blood. You only seem a human being when you are in the witness
box and counsel on the other side is speaking about you and crossexamining you.
As you listen to this speech and watch the mask-like faces in the
jury box, you wonder if it is about yourself that he is talking. You
remember the ardour of the incident, the enthusiasm of your effort-the devotion that sent you on a journey of hours for those
seventy or eighty minutes of propaganda. Are you really that figure
of evil, was your intent always so evil, did you always seem to those
political opponents whom you sought to convince, an enemy so bitter and so malevolent? Did the pages you wrote over so many
years, in so eager an effort to persuade, to find a common mind in
which your fellow citizens could share, really read to them all the
while like the effort of an lago pouring some subtle poison into the
ears of your opponents' vile conspiracy, when you thought at what
you were urging was the magnanimity that gives birth to
conciliation?
The persona which the leader of your opponent makes with so
much artifice from the complex alchemy of your character is well
calculated to leave you certainly disturbed, and possibly almost
stunned-but you must listen to it all with passive restraint. It is
your enemies' hour, and they must have unmasked their batteries,
probed all your motives, dissected with all the hostility they could
muster ends and ideas that you do not even recognise as your own.
And you are then handed over to that same counsel whose life
has so largely been passed in pricking men until they bleed. He
performs his war dance about you like a dervish intoxicated by the
sheer ecstasy of his skill in his own performance, ardent in his
knowledge that, if you trip for one second, his knife is at your

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol12/iss1/15
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V12.I1.14

8

2005]

Callinan: TheCOMPELS
Narrative Compels
Result
NARRATIVE
THEtheRESULT

throat. He makes a pattern from bits and pieces picked with care
from a pattern of life you have been steadily weaving for a quarter
of a century to prove either that you never meant what you intended, or that you lacked every element of skill to give the world
the sense of your intent. He moves between the lines of sarcasm
and insult. It is an effort to tear off, piece by piece, the skin which
he declares no more than a mask behind which a man of understanding could have grasped the foulness of your propose. He
treats you, not as a human being, but as a surgeon might treat some
17
specimen he is demonstrating to students in a dissecting room.
It is also true that the better the narrative, the more convincing,

even perhaps enduring, the judgment is likely to be. The popular adventure novelist Alistair Maclean would have been proud, I think, to
have written as good an introduction to a novel as the terse paragraph
with which Denning L.J. commences his judgment in another defamation case, Broome v. Cassell & Co.:18
Early in July 1942, a large convoy of 35 merchant ships-it had the
code number PQ17-was sailing in the Artic seas lade with materials of war for Russia. They were between North Cape and Spitzbergen, near the icefields. At that time of the year there was no
nightfall. It was light all the time. The convoy was approaching the
most dangerous part of the voyage. The German battle fleet had
come up swiftly and secretly. It was lying in wait in Alten fiord, just
by North Cape. It consisted of the most powerful warship afloatthe Tirpitz-with the cruisers Hipper and Scheer, and six destroyers.
Nearby, at Banak, was an airbase whence the German aircraft could
make sorties of 400 miles to bomb the convoy. Under the sea there
were German submarines watching through their periscopes for a
chance to strike. The convoy would seem an easy target. It could
only make eight knots. It had to steam at the pace of the slowest.
But it was in good hands; it was guarded by the Royal Navy. The
close escort was under the command of Commander Broome, R.N.,
the plaintiff, in the destroyer Keppel. It consisted of six destroyers,
which were very fast, and several converted merchantmen as naval
escorts, which were much slower. In support was a cruiser covering
force under Rear-Admiral Hamilton in The London. It consisted of
four cruisers and three destroyers. Further behind, ready to do battle, was the Home Fleet under Admiral Tovey in the Duke of
York.' 9

That brilliant introductory paragraph was clearly not good news for
the defendant.
In a lighter vein, but equally brilliantly, Vice Chancellor Megarry
created a genuine piece of literature when he wrote these poetically
rhythmic sentences in Flynn v. Flynn:2
17.
18.
19.
20.

Harold Laski, unpublished papers.
Broome v. Cassell & Co., (1971) 2 Q.B. 354 (Eng.).
Id. at 371.
Flynn v. Flynn, (1968) 1 All E.R. 49 (Ch.) (Eng.).
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Errol Flynn was a film actor whose performances gave pleasure to
many millions. On June 20, 1909, he was born in Hobart, Tasmania,
and on October 14, 1959, he died in Vancouver, British Columbia.
When he was seventeen he was expelled from school in Sydney, and
in the next 33 years he lived a life which was full, lusty, restless and
colourful. In his career, in his three marriages, in his friendships, in
his quarrels, and in bed with the many women he took there, he
lived with zest and irregularity. The lives of film stars are not cast in
the ordinary mould, and in some respects Errol Flynn's was more
stellar than most. When he died, he posed the only question that I
have to decide: where was he domiciled at the date of his death? ...
.. During the last year and a half of his life, Errol (as I shall call
him) wrote an autobiography which in England was published
shortly after his death under the title of "My Wicked Wicked
Ways." He wrote this in collaboration with an American journalist
and author named Earl Conrad, who spent some ten weeks with
Errol in the Titchfield Hotel, Port Antonio, Jamaica, in the autumn
of 1958 working on the book. Ungoed-Thomas J. directed that this
book was to be admitted as evidence subject to Mr. Conrad verifying the statements in it made by Errol; and this Mr. Conrad duly
did. I have been referred to a number of specific passages in the
book and I have also looked through the book as a whole. Errol
would, I think, have been the last person to claim that it was a serious study. It is plainly a book intended to entertain and to sell; and
I do not doubt that it has done both. I am not covertly suggesting
that what is said in the book is untrue; but truth is many-sided, and
a wrong impression is perhaps more often conveyed by what is
omitted than by what is said. Nor is it unknown that, in the telling,
a story intended to entertain should grow and be refined. The resemblance between a tombstone and an autobiography may not be
very close; but just as in lapidary inscriptions a man is not upon
oath, so may autobiographies, even though verified by the oath of a
collaborator, fail accurately to convey the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, as the author knows it.
Accordingly I accept the book both as giving a general impression
of an unusual man and as containing the self-portrait which Errol
wished the public to see. I accept it as containing many true statements of fact and intention, even if at times these are somewhat
flamboyant and highly coloured. I would not, however, not accept
it in toto without corroboration. As a sexual athlete Errol may in
truth have attained Olympic standards; but the evident probability
that this was part of the public image which the book was intended
to foster (an image perhaps accentuated rather than weakened by
his overt denials) inevitably induces reservations in the reader. On
the other hand, in many matters there seems to be no reason for not
accepting the substance of what is said, subject to due allowance
being made for the style and nature of the publication and for the
frailties inherent in the human recollections of a man who had lived
a life such as his. At least in the sphere of intention and state of
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol12/iss1/15
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mind, an autobiography written near the end of a man's life may be
of assistance in resolving discrepancies between statements of intention which he is alleged to have made to different people at different times; and I do not forget the perils which lie in seeking too
zealously for consistency of statement and fixity of intention in one
so mercurial as he.2 '
Judicial creativity on the other hand has its dangers. It may be all
very well for Lord Reid to explode the fairy tale that judges declare
the law and do not make it, 2 2 but his Lordship was a Lord of Appeal
in ordinary. The problem with acknowledgment of the myth and its
explosion is the encouragement that it may offer to judges at lower
levels to ring the changes: other judges do it, why shouldn't I? It
might have been better for Lord Reid to have added the caveat that
although judges may do it, they should only do it infrequently, with
great care and restraint and at high levels-in accordance with the
great precedential system of the common law. Despite what he proclaimed, Lord Reid himself was generally careful to avoid the role of
legislator.
The narratives of the law and the narratives of literature also have
this in common: both are published and become a public thing, exposed and open to disagreement and criticism. Judges do public work.
They are aspects of public life. Neither judges nor authors can afford
the luxury of sensitivity. We are spared for the most part, fortunately,
the violent criticisms that authors attract.
I have never read any description of a judge as brutal as that written
by Bernard Levin, the English critic and polemicist. In his critique of
actor Denis Quilley, who performed in a musical version of Blithe
Spirit, Levin stated that "Denis Quilley played the 23role with all the
charm and animation of the leg of a billiard table.
When Michael Redgrave played the lead in Hobson's Choice, the
poison pen critic Kenneth Tynan said that although some critics had
''seen overtones of Lear in his portrayal," he thought "a somewhat
bad tempered Father Christmas would have been nearer the mark."2 4
When Terrace Stamp played Dracula, the Times's dramatic critic
said that he had "nothing to offer except a noble profile, his entrances
were insignificant, his voice without menace or mystery, and his physical tricks consisted largely of flapping his cloak like a bat failing to
take off."25
21. Id. at 50-51.
22. Lord Reid, The Judge as Law Maker, 12 J. Soc'Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 22 (1972).
23. Bernard Levin, Denis Quilley as Charles Condamine in High Spirit (1965), re-

printed in No Turn Unstoned: The Worst ever Theatrical Reviews 41 (Diana Rigg ed.,
1982) (hereinafter No TURN UNSTONED).
24. Harold Brighouse, Michael Redgrave in Hobson's Choice (1964), reprinted in

No

TURN UNSTONED,

supra note 23, at 42.

25. Irving Wardle, Terrence Stamp in Dracula (1978), reprinted in No
STONED,

TURN
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supra note 23, at 44.
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One of the most damning criticisms of all was of a play by J.B.
Priestley called When We are Married, of which one critic said: "It
would make an ideal treat as a night out for your despicable in-laws.
then meet them later at the Theatre
Send them a couple of tickets and
26
restaurant for a blazing row."
I have so far said nothing directly about the need for the narrative
to be truthful. It may readily be acknowledged that absolute truth is
often difficult to find, and that truthful people may honestly believe
that their differing versions, sometimes differing in nuance only, are
true. But, it would be a mistake for a judge or any fact finder to approach the task of constructing the narrative on the basis that the
truth is in the eye of the beholder. Absolute truth may not be achievable, but judges are appointed and paid to come as close to finding it
as humanly possible. To think or speak lightly about different truths
and to believe that the text, the narrative, belongs to all of its readers-however they may choose to construe it-not to its author, is to
disparage the search for truth and truth itself, and, therefore, to treat
the judges' task as futile and of little value or importance. I would
conclude by saying that because the narrative determines the result, it
should always be as complete and true as humanly possible. After all,
in our adversarial system, judges do enjoy the advantage-I think it is
an advantage-of not only hearing both sides of the story, but also of
having both sides tested.
26. When We are Married by J.B. Priestley (1979), reprinted in No
supra note 23, at 89.

TURN UN-

STONED,

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol12/iss1/15
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V12.I1.14

12

